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I. INTRODUCTIONO rder' and discipline' are important to the military services during
both peace and war.3 As a result, the services prohibit various kinds
*The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions provided during the preparation of
this Note by Professor Wilson R. Huhn, University of Akron, C. Blake McDowell Law
Center. This Note was awarded the 1984 Sidney A. Levine Award at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law.
Order refers to the morale and efficiency of a military unit necessary to enable it to
perform its mission. Westmoreland & Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized Uni-
form Code of Military Justice in Combat, 3 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 41-45 (1980).
' Military discipline is an individual standard of conduct impressed upon service mem-
bers to enable them to perform their military duties effectively. It involves obedience to
orders without freedom to determine an individual course of action. See Westmoreland &
Prugh, supra note I, at 48-49.
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)(Air Force regulation requiring a soldier to
obtain commander's approval before circulating petitions on base protected governmental
interest in discipline and did not violate first amendment); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
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of conduct based upon the belief that the proscribed behavior harms or-
der and discipline.4 The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)6 and
the military justice system6 play significant roles in this process.7 The
UCMJ defines, among other wrongs, many disciplinary offenses.' The
(1976)(military commander can prevent circulation of political literature perceived to be a
clear danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975)(federal court intervention in court-martial was not permitted based on military con-
siderations); Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974)(disciplinary article of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice was not unconstitutional as applied to the accused's con-
duct); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)(Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code used to
punish antiwar activities were not impermissibly vague or overbroad).
The Supreme Court refers to the purpose to ensure order and discipline by the term
military necessity. See, e.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at 758. For a recent discussion showing how
several former high ranking military leaders think the military justice system should effec-
tuate this purpose, see Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 1, at 40-50. The authors, a for-
mer Army Chief of Staff and a former Judge Advocate General of the Army, argue that the
structure of the current system and many military court decisions conflict with the require-
ments of order and discipline.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 16 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1983)(Navy regulation prohibit-
ing wrongful possession, transfer, or sale of marijuana); United States v. Tolkach, 14 M.J.
239 (C.M.A. 1982)(Air Force regulation precluded alcohol consumption while performing
alert duties); United States v. Horton, 14 M.J. 96 (C.M.A. 1982)(local Army regulation
barred males from female barracks rooms); United States v. Roettger, 16 M.J. 536
(A.C.M.R. 1983)(Army regulation banned possession of drug paraphernalia); United States
v. Montgomery, 16 M.J. 516 (A.C.M.R. 1983)(switch-blade knives prohibited by Army regu-
lation); United States v. Pettersen, 14 M.J. 608 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982)(Air Force regulation re-
quired men to maintain hair bulk below specified limits), affrd, 17 M.J. 69 (C.M.A. 1983).
Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108. It
amended the Code in 1968, Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335,
and in 1983, Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (current version
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982)).
' The military justice system is the legal system of the military services. It governs
most conduct of military personnel during active duty service in peace or war. For a more
detailed discussion of its structure, see H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY (1972). See
also E. BYRNE. MILITARY LAW (3d ed. 1981)(comprehensive military law source); D. SCHLUE-
TER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1982)(periodically updated
guide to military law).
See H. MOYER, supra note 6, at 11-20. The purpose of military justice to ensure order
and discipline has a long history. As early as 1621, an antecedent to British and American
military law, the Articles of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, provided in Article 116:
Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles and is repugnant to Military
Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent country may against all right
and reason be burdened withall, whatsoever offense finally shall be committed
against these orders, that shall the severall Commanders make good, or see sever-
ally punished unlesse themselves will stand bound to give further satisfaction for
it.
W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 914 (2d ed. 1896 & photo. reprint 1979)(em-
phasis added).
I The UCMJ contains general and specific disciplinary offenses. Articles 92 and 134 are
examples of general disciplinary offenses. Article 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1982), provides in
pertinent part:
Any person subject to this chapter who -
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military justice system prosecutes violations of these offenses and thereby
enforces underlying disciplinary policies, regulations, and customs.9
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; [or]
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of
the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order: or
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 134, U.S.C. § 934 (1982), provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capi-
tal, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cogni-
zance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the direction of that court.
These articles serve as the basis for the general disciplinary offenses because they do not
prohibit specific acts. Instead, Article 92 prohibits violations of any lawful order or regula-
tion and applies to many different kinds of conduct. Similarly, Article 134 prohibits all
conduct which prejudices military order and discipline and does not violate a specific disci-
plinary article in the Code. Although this article also prohibits other actions unrelated to
discipline and order by its discrediting clause, this Note does not discuss this aspect.
Specific disciplinary offenses are exemplified by Article 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1982), which
provides:
Any member of the armed forces who, without authority -
(1) fails to go to his appointed place ofduty at the time prescribed;
(2) goes from that place; or
(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or
place of duty at which he is required to be at the time prescribed;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
These offenses ban limited kinds of activities.
' When allegations that a soldier has violated a provision of the UCMJ arise, his or her
commander initially determines the seriousness of the soldier's conduct and whether legal
sanctions should be imposed. The actual process by which the commander determines the
appropriate legal sanction is beyond the scope of this Note. For an examination of this
process, see D. SCIHLUETER, supra note 6, at 155-204. Among the methods available to prose-
cute a violation, the commander has the option to impose nonjudicial punishment under
Article 15 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982). Article 15 authorizes an administrative
proceeding presided over by the commander who can "in addition to or in lieu of admoni-
tion or reprimand, impose [various] disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the
intervention of a court-martial." Id. If the allegations of misconduct are serious, the com-
mander may recommend a court-martial; the type of processing depends upon the offense
involved, the possible punishment, and the rank of the offender.
The three types of courts-martial are the general, special, and summary courts-martial.
The general court-martial has jurisdiction to try persons subject to the UCMJ for any of-
fense under the Code. It has the power to adjudge any punishment which the UCMJ does
not prohibit, including the death penalty if authorized. Article 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1982).
The special court-martial has jurisdiction to try persons subject to the UCMJ for both non-
capital Code offenses and for capital offenses under regulations promulgated by the Presi-
dent. It has the power to impose any punishment which the UCMJ does not prohibit "ex-
cept death, dishonorable discharge, confinement for more than six months, hard labor
without confinement for more than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay
per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six months." Article 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1982).
1984-85]
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Fraternization is one of these military disciplinary offenses. The term
generally refers to an intimate, but not necessarily sexual, relationship10
between an officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) and a lower rank-
ing enlisted person.',' The relationship is described as wrongful fraterniza-
tion when it is perceived to be harmful to discipline and order." The
harm to discipline allegedly results because military subordinates do not
respect the fraternizing officer or NCO."s Injury to military order occurs
The summary court-martial, unlike special and general courts-martial, only has jurisdiction
over enlisted personnel for noncapital offenses under the UCMJ. It has the power to impose
any punishment under the Code "except death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
charge, confinement for more than one month, hard-labor without confinement for more
than 45 days, restriction to specified limits for more than two months, or forfeiture of more
than two-thirds of one month's pay." Article 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982). If the soldier ob-
jects to trial before summary court-martial, trial may be ordered by special or general court-
martial if appropriate. Id.
" The regulation of undue familiarity is not unique to the military. Government em-
ployees and judges have traditionally been subject to limitations on association intended to
avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest. E.g., Camero v. United, States, 345 F.2d 798
(Ct. Cl. 1965)(civil service employee of the Department of Army dismissed because, among
other acts of misconduct, he was unduly familiar with government contractors). School dis-
tricts have discouraged association among married and unmarried high school students by
prohibiting participation by married students in extracurricular activities. E.g., Romans v.
Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1971)(such a restriction violated the equal protection
guarantee). Private employers have imposed rules prohibiting fraternization among groups
of employees. E.g., Chem Fab Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 996 (1981)(rule prohibiting fraternization
between workers at two plants during working hours was not unlawful in and of itself),
enforced, 691 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1982).
" See Staton v. Froehlke, 390 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975). In the only civilian case in-
volving review of a fraternization conviction, the district court approved of the following
definition:
By "fraternize" as used in these instructions, is meant to associate with another
or others on intimate terms. Not all associations by a military superior with a
subordinate are wrongful. It is the appropriateness of the time, place, circum-
stances, and conduct which is the determinant. To be wrongful, the fraternization
must be of such a nature as to demean the military superior, to detract from the
respect and regard for authority inherent in the superior-subordinate relationship.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 506.
" The loss of respect results, according to an Army general, because:
Experience and human nature show that [discipline] cannot be readily attained
when there is undue familiarity between the officer and those under his command
.... Now and then we see officers who are inclined to neglect or ignore the dis-
tinction that prevails in all armies between officers and men. Soldiers understand
and appreciate the reasons and the necessities which prevent undue familiarity
between officers and their subordinates. They have a thorough contempt for the
officer who forgets his place and his duties and who neglects the requirements of
order and regulations.
Flatten, Fraternization, 10 THE REPORTER 109, 109 (1981)(quoting from a 1921 Army pam-
phlet). Contra Imwinkelried & Zillman, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Re-
flections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396, 412-15 (1976). Professors Im-
winkelried and Zitlman argue that familiarity between ranks does not breed contempt;
[Vol. 33:547
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss3/19
WRONGFUL FRATERNIZATION
since subordinates believe that the superior will not treat them fairly and
their morale decreases.14 However the UCMJ does not express this defini-
tion or rationale because wrongful fraternization is not a specific offense
under the Code. Instead, the definition and its basis arises from the type
of conduct labeled as fraternization and prosecuted by the military justice
system."
Although wrongful fraternization is not a substantive disciplinary of-
fense under the UCMJ, as is being absent without leave"6 or disrespect
toward an officer,'7 it is prosecuted by the military justice system. This
prosecution may occur under three different articles of the UCMJ.
Wrongful fraternization may be charged as a violation of Article 134, the
general disciplinary article, because it violates the military custom against
fraternization and prejudices order and discipline.' 8 A military com-
mander or convening authority may also charge that the conduct violated
Article 133 because the fraternization was conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer."9 In services that have promulgated punitive fraternization regula-
tions, the conduct may also be charged under Article 92 as a violation of
an existing regulation.2" If the fraternization charges are not serious, pros-
ecution under these various articles may be in the form of an administra-
tive proceeding authorized by Article 15.21 When the charges are serious,
instead, familiarity increases comradeship and unit esprit thereby increasing military effi-
ciency. Their views are supported indirectly by a former naval officer in the Royal Nether-
lands Navy. He contends that there is increasing questioning of superiors' orders among
Western armies and less deference to rank. The former officer believes that one reason for
this is the growing complexity of modern weaponry, which often causes subordinates to have
greater technical expertise than their superiors. Another reason for increased familiarity is
that superiors and subordinates often come from similar social classes. N. KEIJZER, MILITARY
OBEDIENCE 43-45 (1978).
" See generally Jamison, Managing Sexual Attraction in the Workplace, 28 PERSONNEL
AD. 45 (1983)(analyzing the perception of preferential treatment in the workplace when inti-
mate relationships occur between superiors and subordinates).
" Throughout the ages, military services have prohibited excessively familiar relation-
ships between officers or NCOs and their enlisted subordinates. See infra notes 33-116 and
accompanying text (discussing the history of the fraternization offense).
,e Article 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1982).
'7 Article 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1982).
'8 See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (explaining how a violation of military
custom also violates Article 134).
"9 Article 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982), provides: "Any commissioned officer ... who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct."
20 Not all current fraternization regulations are regulations within the meaning of Article
92. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (regulations must meet certain require-
ments before they can serve as a basis for an Article 92 charge).
", See supra note 9. Commanders use Article 15 proceedings to resolve many fraterniza-
tion cases. See Drogin, Adam and Eve and the Army, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1979, at 30,
31; Flatten, supra note 13, at 110-12. At least one service expressly provides for administra-
tive discharge of a fraternizing superior. Navy Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1. "Authority
1984-85]
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prosecution will be by court-martial. This Note focuses on the treatment
of fraternization by court-martial, a judicial proceeding, rather than by
administrative action.
The generality of the fraternization offense and the lack of clear guide-
lines indicating under which article fraternization should be prosecuted
have created numerous problems.2 The problems include the following.
There are continued allegations by service members that since the ser-
vices do not have precise fraternization policies or regulations,2" there are
constitutional deficiencies in the prohibition.2 4 In addition, under certain
circumstances, the members of the court-martial, or the military judge if
sitting alone, may be forced to rely on their own subjective belief that the
conduct impaired discipline and order.2 Furthermore, continued prosecu-
for 'other than honorable discharges' is found in SecNav Notice 1920 of March 1982, which
lists the following as one reason to discharge someone for cause: 'disregard by a superior of
customary superior-subordinate relationships.'" Id.
11 For a recent examination of these problems, see H. MOYER, supra note 6, §§ 4-405 to -
406; D. SCHLUETER, supra note 6, at 56-57; Flatten, supra note 13.
'3 Army Regulation 600-20, para. 5-7f (Oct. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as AR 600-20] is
the current Army fraternization regulation. It provides:
Relationships between service members of different rank which involve (or give
the appearance of) partiality, preferential treatment or improper use of rank or
position for personal gain, are prejudicial to good order, discipline and high unit
morale. Such relationships will be avoided. Commanders and supervisors will
counsel those involved or take other action, as appropriate, if relationships be-
tween Service members of different rank -
(1) Cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness,
(2) Involve the improper use of rank or position for personal gain, or
(3) Can otherwise reasonably be expected to undermine discipline, authority, or
morale.
Although the regulation does not expressly refer to fraternization, the Army refers to it as
its fraternization policy. See Women in the Military: Hearings Before the House Military
Personnel Subcommittee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1979)[hereinafter
cited as Women in the Military Hearings].
The Air Force regulation on officer-enlisted association, Air Force Regulation 30-1, pars.
4-b (Sept. 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited as AFR 30-1] provides:
OFFICER AND ENLISTED RELATIONSHIP. Two important characteristics of
the officer and enlisted relationship are loyalty and mutual respect .... We are
all professionals and as such we must treat each other with dignity and respect.
Since we live and work in a very close environment and endure common hard-
ships, officers and enlisted personnel frequently develop close personal friend-
ships. However, friendships must not interfere with judgment or duty
performance.
As of late 1983, the Navy and Marine Corps did not have fraternization regulations. Navy
Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 2.
" See, e.g., Staton v. Froehlke, 390 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975)(warrant officer convicted
of wrongful fraternization alleged that Article 134 provided inadequate notice of prohibited
fraternization); United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(NCO convicted of vio-
lation of post fraternization regulation contended there was insufficient notice of illegal as-
sociation), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
' For instance, one military appellate court stated that in certain situations, the trial
[Vol. 33:547
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tion of fraternization under Article 133 may conflict with the disciplinary
basis of the prohibition and judicial precedent.2 6
The following factors increase the significance of these problems. A
finding by a court-martial that fraternization violates the UCMJ carries
serious consequences. Depending on the type of court-martial, the service
member could receive a less than honorable discharge, accompanying loss
of service benefits, confinement at hard labor, or loss of pay and al-
lowances.2 7 The expanded number of women in the military since the mid
1970's"s and the changing nature of military services29 are likely to in-
crease the chance of fraternization. Finally, whether these last two factors
caused the increase in the incidence of fraternization, there has been such
an increase."
Although only the Army and Air Force have attempted to remedy the
problems arising from the lack of clear legal guidelines, all four services
continue prosecution of the offense.31 Furthermore, although several of
the Courts of Military Review have recently restricted the application of
the prohibition, these courts as well as the highest military appellate
court, the Court of Military Appeals, continue to recognize the validity of
fraternization offenses under Articles 92, 133, or 134.32 In view of the de-
counsel (prosecution) does not have to introduce any evidence that the fraternizing supe-
rior's conduct prejudiced good order and discipline. United States v. Cooper, No.
CM438700, slip op. at 3-4 (A.C.M.R. Aug. 11, 1980). This rule forces the trier of fact,
whether the military judge or members of a court-martial, to rely exclusively on their own
experience in determining the existence of prejudicial effect.
"e See infra notes 157-72 and accompanying text.
- The service-wide Manual for Courts-Martial provides the maximum punishments
which can be imposed upon a service member if he or she is convicted of fraternization
under Articles 92, 133, or 134. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1984 16e, 83e [hereinafter cited as MCM].
1* In 1980, the military services predicted the following increases in the number of
women. The Army indicated an increase from over 98,000 in 1979-80 to almost 162,000 by
1985. The Navy planned to increase from over 29,000 in 1979-80 to 45,000 by 1985. The
Marine Corps expected to increase eventually from almost 6,000 women in 1979-80 to
10,000. By 1980, there were approximately 51,500 women in the Air Force with a predicted
increase to 97,000 by 1985. See Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 23, at 55, 89,
113-14, 144, 149. In recent years, the military has backed away from this planned expansion
but still intends to recruit approximately 40,000 women per year. J. HOLM, WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY 387-88 (1982).
29 For a discussion of the increasing civilianization of the military, see Sherman, Mili-
tary Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1401-02 (1973). But cf. West-
moreland & Prugh, supra note 1 (arguing that civilianization of the military is largely a
product of military courts).
so Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 23, at 118. See also Flatten, supra note
13, at 114 (describing numerous incidents observed by the author).
" See, e.g., United States v. Adames, 18 M.J. 296 (C.M.A. 1984)(Army); United States v.
Smith, 18 M.J. 786 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984)(Marine Corps); United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J.
862 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983)(Air Force); United States v. Goodyear, 14 M.J. 567 (N.M.C.M.R.
1982)(Navy).
31 Although two fraternization convictions were recently reversed by military appellate
1984-851
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
sire of the services to continue to prosecute fraternization and continued
judicial sanctioning, this Note undertakes an analysis of the fraterniza-
tion prohibition in order to illustrate the current problems. The first part
of this Note proposes that the evolution of the prohibition demonstrates
that fraternization has become exclusively a disciplinary offense. The de-
velopment of the offense over the years also shows that the failure of the
military to define the offense precisely by regulation or article allowed
military courts to construct varying and confusing definitions. The second
part of the Note analyzes the validity of fraternization convictions under
UCMJ Articles 92, 133, and 134. Part three recommends that each of the
military services issue detailed fraternization regulations. These regula-
tions should satisfy the requirements of prohibitiveness and punitiveness
so that they can serve as the basis of an Article 92 conviction. They
should also contain features that will decrease the chances of arbitrary
application and lack of notice to the service member. The conclusion sug-
gests that unless such guidelines are formulated, the significant problems
with the current offense will increase leading to additional service mem-
ber and public dissatisfaction.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY PROHIBITION AGAINST
FRATERNIZATION
A. Early British Military Law
British military law which provided the original pattern for United
States military law partially supplied the roots from which the fraterniza-
tion offense grew. 33 It furnished the antecedent to the general disciplinary
article of the UCMJ, Article 134.31 British military law also contributed
the predecessor to the UCMJ article governing officers' conduct, Article
courts, the Army and Air Force Courts of Military Review indicated that intimate associa-
tion between officers or NCOs and enlisted members continues, under certain circum-
stances, to be a violation of the UCMJ. See United States v. Stocken, 17 M.J. 826, 828-30
(A.C.M.R. 1984); Johanns, 17 M.J. at 868.
Challenges to the validity of the fraternization offense have mainly occurred in the mili-
tary appellate courts. The structure of the military appellate system is as follows. The initial
appellate court, the service Court of Military Review, reviews all court-martial convictions
from a particular service where the approved sentence "affects a general or flag officer or
extends to death [or involves] dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman,
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more." Article 66, 10
U.S.C. § 866(b)(1982). The highest military appellate court, the Court of Military Appeals,
reviews all cases where the sentence affirmed by the Court of Military Review involves a
general or flag officer or the death penalty. It also reviews cases that the service Judge
Advocate General orders sent to the court for review or upon petition of the accused and
good cause shown. Article 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(1982).
"3 W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 18-21.
"4 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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133.35 The manner in which fraternization was prosecuted under these
historical antecedents to American military law provided the early basis
for American treatment of the offense.
3 6
One of the primary sources of British military law was the Articles of
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. 7 Although the Articles of Gustavus
Adolphus did not expressly forbid any social association between the
ranks of the army, they did prohibit certain types of contact between of-
ficers and their soldiers.38 Article 116 of the Articles prohibited any con-
duct "repugnant to Military Discipline." 9 Article 133 barred indiscrimi-
nate lending by officers to their subordinates.4
0
Drawing upon the Articles of Gustavus Adolphus, the British issued the
first Articles of War in the 1600's.11 One of these early British Articles
prohibited any disorderly conduct which was not barred by the other Ar-
ticles.4 2 By the mid 1700's, the development of the original Articles had
resulted in a general disciplinary article and an article prohibiting scan-
dalous and infamous conduct by an officer. 4 3 The purposes of these two
articles differed. The general disciplinary article was intended to apply to
offenses against discipline which were not expressly recognized by the
other British Articles.4 4 The article governing officers' conduct pertained
only to officers whose dishonorable conduct was scandalous and infa-
mous.4' Although British military authorities do not appear to have tried
3 W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 931-46.
s See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632) led the Swedish army and defeated numerous other
armies. As a means to govern his soldiers' conduct he created a military code, the Articles of
Gustavus Adolphus, in 1621. Numerous British officers and soldiers serving in his army
relied on their experience with this code when formulating the British Articles of War. W.
WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 19 & n.15.
" Id. at 907-18.
3' Id. at 914. The full text of Article 116 is quoted at supra note 7.
" The Article provided that "if any Captain lends money unto his souldiers which he
desires should be paid againe, that must be done in the presence of the Muster-masters [a
combination personnel, finance, and supply officer], that our service be in no way hindered
or neglected." Id. at 915.
" Id. at 19.
" Article LXIV of the English Military Discipline of James II in 1686 provided that
"faults, misdemeanors, and Disorders not mentioned in these Articles, shall be punished
according to the Laws and Customs of War, and discretion of the Court-Martial." Id. at 928.
"3 Article XXIII, Section XV of the British Articles of War of 1765, prohibited "scandal-
ous infamous [behavior], such as is unbecoming the character of an officer" and provided
for dismissal. Id. at 945.
Article III, Section XX, its general disciplinary article, prohibited "all Disorders or Ne-
glects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good Order and
Military Discipline." Id. at 946.
Id. at 719.
" Id. For a discussion of the concern for the honor of the British officer corps, see Note,
The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18 UCLA L. REV. 820,
825-26 (1971). The author contends that the British antecedent to our Article 133 was a
1984-85]
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
many cases of fraternization, at the time the American Articles of War
originated, prosecution, occurred only under the article governing officers'
conduct."'
B. American Articles of War
The American Articles of War provided the American antecedents to
the general disciplinary article, Article 134, and the article governing of-
ficers' conduct, Article 133, of the UCMJ. 47 The judicial interpretation of
these American Articles and their application to particular kinds of frat-
ernization initially paralleled prior British application and interpreta-
tion.48 Later application and interpretation, however, differed and pro-
vided part of the foundation for current prosecution and judicial analysis
of the fraternization offense under the Code. 9
When the Second Continental Congress adopted the Articles of War for
its newly-formed army in 1775, two of the Articles were a general discipli-
nary article and an article governing officers' conduct.50 These articles
corresponded to their British counterparts pertaining to disciplinary of-
fenses and officers' behavior." The amendment of these original Ameri-
can Articles of War later in 1775 retained the two designated articles but
also added the only American article in either the Articles of War or the
later Code that expressly prohibited social association by an officer.52
status-based offense intended to preserve the social status of the British officer corps. He
suggests that British officers, after purchasing their commissions, valued their high social
status as military officers in British society. The British Article governing officers' conduct
provided for the discharge of officers whose actions tended to degrade this status.
11 W. HOUGH, MILITARY LAW AUTHORITIES 199 (1839). In his compilation of judicial pre-
cedent under the British Articles of War, this commentator on British military law indi-
cated that officers who drank liquor with NCOs and enlisted men violated the article gov-
erning officers' conduct.
W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 957.
Id. at 716 & n.44.
'9 See United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545, slip op. at 4-6 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 29,
1982)(Miller, J., concurring), modified on other grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984).
" W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 953-59. These articles were Articles XLVII and L.
Article XLVII provided: "Whatsoever commissioned officer shall be convicted before a gen-
eral court-martial of behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is unbecoming the
character of an officer and a gentleman, shall be discharged from the service." Id. at 957.
Article L provided:
All crimes, not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers
may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not
mentioned in the articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general or
regimental court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
be punished at their discretion.
Id.
" Id. at 931-46. Their British counterparts were Article XXIII, Section XV and Article
III, Section XX of the British Articles of War of 1765.
" W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 959.
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This latter article, retained among the American Articles until Congress
enacted the UCMJ, prohibited military officers from associating with of-
ficers dismissed for cowardice or fraud. 3 Although the first two early
American Articles were applied to fraternization, the associational article
apparently was rarely, if ever, used. 4
The wording of the articles concerning general disciplinary offenses and
officers' demeanor remained virtually unchanged throughout the exis-
tence of the American Articles of War.58 However, their application to
fraternizing conduct by officers and NCOs changed dramatically during
the life of the American Articles. Initially, military commanders prose-
cuted fraternization almost exclusively under the article governing of-
ficers' conduct. By the latter days of the American Articles, prosecution
concentrated primarily on the general disciplinary article.5 6
During the 1800's and the early years of the American Articles, the pri-
mary basis for prosecutions was the antecedent to the present Article
133. 5" Under that Article, officers who drank, caroused, gambled, were
unbecomingly familiar with, or conducted themseleves indecently in the
presence of military inferiors were court-martialed for its violation and
discharged."' This Article, intended to preserve the status of officers, was
applied to this conduct because the officers' actions involving subordi-
nates were considered to be demeaning to that status.8 9 The punishment,
dismissal from military service, protected that status by removing offend-
ing officers.60
Although prosecution for fraternization transpired predominately
under the article governing officers' conduct during this period, some as-
sociational offenses were pursued under the general disciplinary article."'
For example, the Article was applied to gambling between NCOs and
their subordinates."' The disciplinary article, rather than the officers' ar-
ticle, pertained because an NCO by definition is not an officer, and his
51 Id. Additional Article 4 provided:
In all cases where a commissioned officer is [dismissed] for cowardice or fraud, it
be added in punishment, that the crime, name, place of abode, and punishment of
[this officer] be published in the newspapers, in and about the camp, and of that
colony from which the offender came, or usually resided, after which it shall be
deemed scandalous in any officer to associate with him.
Id.
Winthrop, a noted commentator on United States military law, does not indicate any
court-martial decisions involving this associational article. Id. at 534-772.
*1 Compare American Articles XLVII and L, id. at 957, with American Articles 95 and
96 quoted at infra note 66.
" See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
" W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 716 & n.44.
58 Id.
5 See Note, supra note 45, at 825-26.
00 W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 957, 969, 974, 983, 991.
81 Id. at 727 & n.1l.
62 Id. at 730 & n.68.
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conduct could not demean the status of an officer although it could ad-
versely affect discipline.63 Surprisingly, the early disciplinary article was
also applied to some types of gambling between officers and their enlisted
men.6 4 This indicated that under certain circumstances even early mili-
tary commanders believed that some kinds of fraternizing activity by an
officer did not demean status but did offend discipline.
This belief became the dominant theme of fraternization prosecutions
during the remaining existence of the American Articles of War. 5 This
litigation, involving officers for the most part, took the following form
under the article relating to officers' behavior and the general disciplinary
article, at this point numbered Articles 95 and 96 respectively. 6 The
court-martial convening authority would charge the fraternizing activity,
usually involving drinking liquor with enlisted subordinates or soliciting
and pursuing the company and association of enlisted men, under Article
95 governing officers' behavior. 7 If the court-martial convicted the officer
under the Article, upon appellate review by the Judge Advocate General
Board of Review, 8 this finding would often be reversed. The Board of
Review generally held that the evidence sustained a conviction only under
11 See id. at 719. The early American disciplinary article, like its British predecessor,
was intended to ensure punishment of disciplinary offenses which were not expressly listed
in the American Articles of War.
64 Id. at 727 & n.11.
61 During and after World War II, fraternization prosecutions also involved purely social
or more intimate association between American soldiers and Germans during the occupation
of Germany. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 30 B.R. (ETO) 75 (A.B.R. 1945); United
States v. Flackman, 10 B.R. (ETO) 255 (A.B.R. 1945). This Note does not examine this type
of fraternization.
" Article 95 provided: "CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND GEN-
TLEMAN. - Any officer or cadet who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service." Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759,
806 (repealed 1950).
Article 96 provided:
GENERAL ARTICLE: Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to military law may be guilty of, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
41 Stat. at 806-07 (repealed 1950).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 41 B.R. 365 (A.B.R. 1944)(officer who trans-
ported enlisted.men in his car, stayed in same hotel room, and swam with them charged
under Article 95); United States v. Bunker, 27 B.R. 385 (A.B.R. 1943)(officer who drank
with enlisted men while in uniform at a public place charged under Article 95); United
States v. Field, 21 B.R. 41 (A.B.R. 1943)(drinking by officer in uniform with platoon mem-
bers charged under Article 95).
08 In 1969, the Judge Advocate General of each of the military services established a
Court of Military Review replacing the earlier service Judge Advocate General Boards of
Review. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, § 2(27), 82 Stat. 1335, 1341-42
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1982)).
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the general disciplinary article, Article 96.69 Its rationale was that the of-
ficers' conduct did not disgrace or dishonor him within the meaning of
Article 95. The conduct, however, did violate the military custom against
social fraternization between officers and enlisted men.
70
The Board of Review's analysis of the offense during this period pro-
vided that almost any social association between an officer and enlisted
person violated the military prohibition against fraternization. 7' Despite
sometimes disavowing that effect,72 the Board of Review sustained con-
victions under Article 96 merely because association had occurred.7" It
did not extensively discuss whether the officers' conduct injured disci-
11 See cases cited supra note 67; see also United States v. Slater, 74 B.R. 371 (A.B.R.
1947)(officer became drunk in enlisted subordinate's home); United States v. Doty, 67 B.R.
281 (A.B.R. 1947)(officer in company of enlisted personnel and civilians in public bar);
United States v. Heaton, 64 B.R. 3 (A.B.R. 1946)(officer attended enlisted club with enlisted
men); United States v. Epperson, 58 B.R. 323 (A.B.R. 1946)(officer took one or two drinks
with enlisted men at bar); United States v. Mann, 55 B.R. 381 (A.B.R. 1945)(officer drank
at public place with enlisted men); United States v. Katz, 54 B.R. 135 (A.B.R. 1945)(male
officer imbibed during duty hours with enlisted woman); United States v. Friel, 53 B.R. 103
(A.B.R. 1945)(officer went on drinking spree with enlisted men); United States v. Futrell, 47
B.R. 339 (A.B.R. 1945)(female officer wrongfully associated with Navy enlisted men);
United States v. Wright, 44 B.R. 183 (A.B.R. 1945)(officer went to party with enlisted per-
sonnel); United States v. Penick, 19 B.R. (ETO) 257 (A.B.R. 1945)(officer drank, played
darts, and went out to eat with NCO); United States v. Johnston, 23 B.R. 57 (A.B.R.
1943)(officer on duty status drank and gambled with enlisted subordinates).
"o The Board of Review in United States v. Patterson, 41 B.R. 365 (A.B.R. 1944), stated:
"Social fraternization between officers and enlisted personnel is prohibited by military cus-
tom and not by any specific provision of the Articles of War. The basis of the custom is
military discipline." Id. at 368.
71 See Epperson, 58 B.R. at 326. Although the Board considered an officer's act of tak-
ing one or two drinks with enlisted men in a bar as "trivial," it affirmed his conviction
under Article 96.
11 See Bunker, 27 B.R. at 389.
73 The Army Board of Review decision in United States v. Hart, 60 B.R. 247 (A.B.R.
1946), provides an interesting contrast. The Board reversed a court-martial finding that the
officer violated Article 96 by drinking in a hotel with an enlisted man. It found that there
was insufficient evidence to show an adverse impact upon discipline because the officer did
not become drunk or create a disturbance. Id. at 255-56. It also reversed a finding that the
officer violated Articles 95 and 96 by seeking the same enlisted man's company. Although
the accused and the man had dinner and took several trips, the Board found insufficient
evidence to establish that the officer schemed to enjoy his company. Since the man willingly
accepted the officer's invitations, the court again found no adverse impact upon discipline.
Id. at 256-57.
The Hart decision may have been influenced by the findings of the post World War II
Doolittle Commission which had studied officer-enlisted relationships. This commission
composed of officers and enlisted men recommended that "all statutes, regulations, customs,
and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers . . . because of mili-
tary rank" be abolished. REPORT ON THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S BOARD ON OFFICER - EN-
LISTED MAN RELATIONSHIPS, S. Doc. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Ses8. 22 (1946). It issued its
report in 1946, the year of the Hart decision.
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pline or order because it was assumed that it did." Although later mili-
tary courts would hold that not all social association between officers or
NCOs and enlisted personnel violated the general disciplinary article, the
actual prejudicial effect of fraternization was usually beyond question.s
C. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The enactment of the UCMJ in 1950 brought the three articles under
which the fraternization offense is currently prosecuted." Two of the
three articles, Articles 133 and 134, retained wording similar to that of
their predecessors in the American Articles of War.7" Article 92 had no
antecedent in the American Articles. The substantial similarity between
two of three UCMJ articles under which fraternization is now prosecuted
and the two American Articles which previously applied to the conduct
should require a continuity between prosecution under the American Ar-
ticles and the UCMJ. Yet, the judicial definition of fraternization and the
conduct to which it applied differed significantly between the Articles
and the Code.78 Nevertheless, even with differing judicial interpretations
of the offense under the UCMJ, fraternization continued to be a discipli-
nary offense rather than a status-based offense.
A change in the judicial definition of the offense was perceived within
three years of the enactment of the Code. During this period, the military
"4 United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545, slip op. at 5 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 29,
1982)(Miller, J., concurring), modified on other grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984). Dis-
cussing the judicial analysis of fraternization in United States v. Patterson, 41 B.R. 365
(A.B.R. 1944), a military judge on the Air Force Court of Military Review recently
remarked:
[The Board of Review] had no difficulty in deciding that the accused's actions did
support a violation of Article of War 96 (the equivalent of our current U.C.M.J.,
Article 134, conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline), The reason it had
no difficulty in proclaiming the accused guilty of this latter offense, was because
in 1944, it was perfectly clear to the Board that any officer who engaged in this
type of social intercourse with enlisted personnel was per se violating the then
existent military custom against fraternization ....
Rodriquez, slip op. at 5.
" See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, No. CM438700, slip op. at 4 (A.C.M.R. Aug. 11,
1980)(direct testimony or judicial notice of sources that would show fraternizing activities
prejudiced order and discipline not required in Article 134 court-martial proceeding).
" E.g., United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 29, 1982)(officer
violated Article 134 by smoking marijuana with and propositioning male and female enlisted
personnel), modified on other grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984); United States v. Jeffer-
son, 14 M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982)(officer fraternized in violation of Article 133 by having
sexual intercourse with enlisted woman during duty hours in barracks); United States v.
Hoard, 12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(NCO fraternized in violation of Article 92 by socializing
in his quarters with basic trainees), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
" Compare Article 95 and 96 quoted supra note 66 with Article 133, supra note 19, and
Article 134, supra note 8.
78 See infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
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courts considered a series of cases where the wrongful conduct, although
not always expressly termed fraternization, involved association between
superior and subordinate which blurred distinction between the ranks.
The charged conduct involved officers who borrowed money from enlisted
subordinates79 and officers who sought and obtained enlisted men's com-
pany. 0 These charges, like the others described in this section, were
brought under Article 134, the general disciplinary article."1
In 1952 and 1953, the Army Board of Review considered the cases in-
volving borrowing from enlisted subordinates. United States v. St. Ours82
illustrated the rationale which the Board employed in subsequent bor-
rowing cases. Indicating that borrowing money from an enlisted man is
not a violation per se of Article 134, the Board analyzed the circum-
stances in which borrowing occurred. 8 If the officer obtained money
under circumstances which made it likely that his act prejudiced order
and discipline, there was a violation of the general article.8 4 In St. Ours,
the Board found that the officer's act of borrowing prejudiced order and
discipline because of the command relationship that had existed between
the borrower and the lender and the officer's failure to repay his debt.8 5
However, a failure to repay the debt was not necessary for a violation of
the Article. Considering a case in which an officer became indebted to his
subordinates but promptly paid that debt, the Board in United States v.
Galloway8 6 found a violation of the general article. The mere act of bor-
rowing when there was a command relationship between the lender and
the debtor was conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.87 Injury
to order and discipline resulted because such acts weakened enlisted sub-
ordinates' respect for their superior with financial difficulties. 88
The analysis by the Army Board in these borrowing cases demon-
strated a focus on the existence of a command relationship between the
fraternizing officer and the lending subordinate which continued in vary-
7 E.g., United States v. Wetzell, 12 C.M.R. 269 (A.B.R. 1953)(officer borrowed money
from enlisted subordinate and failed to repay it), appeal denied, 14 C.M.R. 229 (C.M.A.
1954); United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323 (A.B.R. 1952)(officer borrowed money from
NCOs in his unit and promptly repaid it), aff'd, 9 C.M.R. 63 (C.M.A. 1953); United States v.
St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (A.B.R. 1952)(officer borrowed from and failed to repay enlisted
man).
80 E.g., United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953)(naval officer dined and en-
tertained enlisted men); United States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206 (A.B.R. 1952)(Army of-
ficer drank with and talked to enlisted man in his private tent), appeal denied, 8 C.M.R.
178 (C.M.A. 1953).
8I See authorities cited supra notes 79 & 80.
02 6 C.M.R. 178 (A.B.R. 1952).
" Id. at 185.
84 Id.
86 Id.
86 8 C.M.R. 323 (A.B.R. 1952).
87 Id. at 327.
8 Id.
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ing degree in later fraternization cases."9 The Board's discussion also
showed a continued assumption that fraternization was automatically
conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. The Board did not re-
quire evidence that the officers' conduct in fact caused disorder or loss of
discipline. Instead, proof of the fraternizing act despite conflicting evi-
dence of its prejudicial effect was sufficient to establish a violation of Ar-
ticle 134.90
During the same period, the Army and Navy Boards of Review also
considered a different set of fraternization charges. These cases involved
officers who wrongfully sought relationships with enlisted men.9 In Liv-
ingston, the Army Board consistently applied a rule which it had earlier
articulated in United States v. Patterson92 that any social association be-
tween officers and enlisted men violates Article 134.2 However, the Navy
Board in United States v. Free9 4 pursued a different path which would
later guide the highest military court, the Court of Military Appeals.
In United States v. Livingston,95 the Army Board of Review considered
whether an officer who invited an enlisted subordinate into his tent on
numerous occasions to drink and talk violated the general disciplinary
article. Expressly relying on Patterson, the Board held that the officer's
acts of social association constituted wrongful fraternization in violation
of Article 134.9' The analysis by the Navy Board of Review in United
States v. Free97 during the next year was in sharp contrast. In Free, the
officer had invited an enlisted man to dinner, paid for his meal, and al-
lowed him to stay overnight in the officer's quarters.99 Failing to employ
the Patterson rule that all social association between officers and enlisted
See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
o This reasoning by assumption is viable even today. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper,
No. CM438700, slip op. at 3-4 (A.C.M.R. Aug. 11, 1980). The Army Court of Military Re-
view, analyzing whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the fraterni-
zation was prejudicial to good order and discipline, stated:
Trial defense counsel elicited from each of [the enlisted women that the officer
was accused of fraternizing with] statements that they were not the [officer's] sub-
ordinates at the time of their sexual liaisons in that the [officer] was no longer
their company commander. Each also stated that they had not lost respect for
him. Notwithstanding such assertions, there can be no doubt that sexual liaisons
conducted on post in officer's BOQ room between that officer and enlisted person-
nel of his battalion are prejudicial to good order and discipline.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
9 E.g., United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953); United States v. Livingston,
8 C.M.R. 206 (A.B.R. 1952), appeal denied, 8 C.M.R. 178 (C.M.A. 1953).
"' 41 B.R. 365 (A.B.R. 1944).
8 C.M.R. at 210.
14 C.M.R. 466, 468 (N.B.R. 1953).
8 C.M.R. at 210.
*s Id.
0714 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953).
11 Id. at 468.
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men violated Article 134, the Navy Board held that only particular kinds
of fraternization violate the Article. A violation of Article 134 occurred if
the fraternization was not "innocent acts of comradeship and normal so-
cial intercourse between members of a democratic military force."99 The
Board in Free, in contrast to the Army Board of Review, thereby indi-
cated that "normal" association was not conduct prejudicial to order and
discipline and did not violate the general article. Since the Navy Board
strongly suggested there was homosexual conduct involved in Free, it
found abnormal association and wrongful fraternization.'
From 1957 to 1968, the successor to the Army Board of Review, the
Army Court of Military Review, resumed analysis of cases of fraterniza-
tion involving borrowing money from enlisted personnel.' 0' In these cases
concerning NCOs who borrowed from lower ranking enlisted men, the
court, like its predecessor in the St. Ours series of cases, noted that bor-
rowing between ranks does not necessarily violate Article 134.12 The
court focused on the presence or absence of coercion on the part of the
debtor and on the existence of a command relationship between the
lender and the debtor. If the NCO's act of borrowing from an enlisted
man involved coercive conduct, the act was prohibited by Article 134, re-
gardless if there was a command relationship between the debtor and
lender. Lending was forced, when the NCO promised to reward or
threatened an enlisted man, thereby inducing a loan or a failure to de-
mand prompt repayment. 3 However, even if an actual abuse of authority
had not occurred, when an NCO borrows from enlisted men within his
chain of command, an unacceptable risk of abuse was created. 104 Thus,
borrowing money under either of these two circumstances prejudiced
good order and discipline in violation of Article 134. If the NCO borrowed
from men outside of his chain of command, unless coercion occurred, the
court found an insufficient risk of an abuse of authority and held that no
violation existed. 0 5 Although military courts never expressly applied this
definition of wrongful fraternization outside of the borrowing context, the
9 Id.
'oo Id. at 468-72. The Board's decision impliedly approved less intimate relationships be-
cause a contrary holding provided that officers and enlisted personnel were separate classes
and could not associate.
E.g., United States v. Mayne, 39 C.M.R. 628 (A.B.R. 1968)(drill sergeant solicited and
accepted loans from basic trainee in his platoon); United States v. Light, 36 C.M.R. 579
(A.B.R. 1965)(battalion sergeant major borrowed money from lower ranking enlisted men);
United States v. Villiados, 32 C.M.R. 561 (A.B.R. 1962)(ranking NCO in unit borrowed
money from enlisted members in return for favors); United States v. Calderon, 24 C.M.R.
338 (A.B.R. 1957)(sergeant borrowed money from basic trainees, some of whom were as-
signed to his unit).
... E.g., Calderon, 24 C.M.R. at 340.
... Id. at 339-40.
... Id. at 340.
-oo Id.
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services would later incorporate it into their fraternization regulations."'
By the 1970's, with the varying definitions and tests of wrongful frater-
nization, the stage was set for resolution by the Court of Military Ap-
peals. The court, upon review of United States v. Lovejoy'0 7 and United
States v. Pitasi,'0 5 adopted the current definition of fraternization. In
Lovejoy and Pitasi, the Navy had charged two male naval officers with
sexual offenses and fraternizing with enlisted men. Reviewing their court-
martial convictions under Article 134, the court followed the standard of
wrongful fraternization espoused earlier by the Navy Board of Review in
United States v. Free.09 The court held that the alleged sexual relation-
ships between the male officers and enlisted men did not involve normal
"social intercourse" or "innocent" acts of comradeship and violated the
custom against fraternization."' The decisions implied, however, that
some kinds of association were permitted under the Code.
With the adoption of this standard of wrongful fraternization, the
struggle throughout the 1970's and 1980's has been to determine the dif-
ference between normal association and wrongful fraternization. In the
1970's, the Army and Air Force sought to provide clarification by issuing
regulations containing guidelines on prohibited fraternization. 1' The
1977 Air Force regulation focused on associations which interfered with
judgment or duty performance." 2 The 1978 Army regulation centered on
preferential treatment and improper use of rank or position for personal
gain."' Lower level Army commanders put forth additional fraternization
106 See, e.g., United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563, 566 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(local post policy
prohibited relationships between permanent party personnel and basic trainees in order to
prevent improper influence of the trainees), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
I07 20 C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970)(naval officer shared apartment with a sailor).
20 C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31 (1971)(naval officer accused of fraternization, lewd acts,
and sodomy with enlisted man).
109 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953).
11 Pitasi, 20 C.M.A. at 606-08, 44 C.M.R. at 36-38; Lovejoy, 20 C.M.A. at 20-21, 42
C.M.R. at 212-13.
" ' See supra note 23. The Air Force had also issued earlier guidance in the form of an
opinion letter by its Judge Advocate General. The opinion stated in pertinent part:
2. Social contact between officers and enlisted men is limited only to the extent
that the contact would undermine the mission and operational effectiveness of the
Air Force. There is a custom in the military service, one of long standing and well
recognized as such, and fulfilling all the requirements set forth in the Manual for
Courts-Martial for its breach to be an offense under UCMJ, Article 134, that of-
ficers shall not fraternize [or] associate with enlisted men .... [These] guidelines
are provided . . . recognizing that in any effective supervisory situation, whether
it be civil or military, there must be present in the relationship some degree of
authority, respect, discipline, and morale. Without these elements the job simply
cannot be accomplished in a safe and efficient manner.
Officers: Fraternization with Enlisted Personnel, Op. JAG AF 1971/69 (July 30, 1971)[here-
inafter cited as 1971 AF Opinion].
"' See AFR 30-1, supra note 23.
M' See AR 600-20, supra note 23.
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regulations prohibiting all social fraternization among certain classes of
soldiers, such as basic trainees and their leaders."1 4 The gender neutrality
of these regulations and actual prosecution of fraternization between op-
posite sexes indicate that what is ordinarily "normal" is not normal asso-
ciation in the fraternization context."95 In addition, these regulations im-
ply and recent court-martial cases demonstrate that wrongful
fraternization may even include relationships between any two service
members, although neither member is an NCO or an officer."1
The next section of this Note analyzes more recent cases on fraterniza-
tion involving Articles 92, 133, and 134 in an attempt to resolve the fol-
lowing: whether a fraternization conviction based on an existing service or
local command regulation under Article 92 should be sustained; whether
wrongful fraternization as currently defined violates Article 133; and the
extent of the military custom against fraternization under Article 134.
III. FRATERNIZATION AS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 92, 133, AND 134 OF
THE UCMJ
A. Article 92
1. The Service Fraternization Regulations, AR 600-20, paragraph 5-7f
and AFR 30-1, paragraph 4-b as the Bases for an Article 92 Violation
A service member violates Article 92 by disobeying a lawful regulation
issued by a military service. ' 1 7 Therefore, at least theoretically, an officer
or NCO who disobeys AR 600-20 or AFR 30-1 also violates Article 92.118
However, the Courts of Military Review and Court of Military Appeals
hold that only transgressions of punitive regulations violate Article 92."18
A service regulation is punitive if it contains words of prohibition and
announces that its violation subjects the service member to criminal pros-
ecution under the UCMJ. 12 °
." See, e.g., United States v. Moorer, 15 M.J. 520, 522-23 (A.C.M.R. 1983)(Fort Gordon
policy letter concerning fraternization), petition granted, 16 M.J. 112 (C.M.A. 1983); United
States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 536, 568-69 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(United States Army Training Center
and Fort Dix Regulation 600-2), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
.. See Moorer, 15 M.J. at 522 (prohibited association included an enlisted man asking an
enlisted woman for a date).
1,8 Id. at 521. The accused, a Specialist Five, was neither an NCO nor an officer.
S7 ee supra note 8 (quoting Article 92 in pertinent part).
118 AR 600-20 and AFR 30-1 are set forth supra note 23.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 22 C.M.A. 25, 46 C.M.R. 25 (1972). See generally
Holmes, Punitive vs. Nonpunitive Regulations: The Emasculation of Article 92, ARMY
LAW., Aug. 1975, at 6 (examining use of military regulations under Article 92); Nagle, Regu-
lations in the Courtroom, 14 THE ADVOCATE 65 (1982).
"' See Nagle, supra note 119, at 66-70.
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As presently worded, the service wide fraternization regulations should
not serve as the basis for a conviction under Article 92. Neither AR 600-
20 nor AFR 30-1 meet both judicial requirements for a punitive regula-
tion. The regulations do contain words of prohibition. The Army guide-
lines state that specified kinds of fraternization "will be avoided...... The
Air Force standard provides that "friendships must not interfere with
judgment or duty performance.' 122 Announcement of the penalty for vio-
lation is missing; neither directive indicates that violation of its provi-
sions subjects the officer or NCO to prosecution under the UCMJ. As a
result, the Army and Air Force should not charge fraternization in viola-
tion of these regulations under Article 92.123
2. Local Command Directives as the Bases for Article 92 Violations
a. Punitiveness
Army commanders responded to the practical inability to prosecute
fraternization under Department of Army regulations and to special disci-
plinary considerations.' Several commanders at posts having large num-
bers of basic trainees issued local directives prohibiting fraternization.125
Unlike the service-wide fraternization regulations, these local standards
are adequate punitive regulations under Article 92. They contain required
words of prohibition and announce a punitive standard. An example of
such a directive, a 1979 Fort Gordon Command Policy letter, prohibited
- AR 600-20, supra note 23.
2 AFR 30-1, supra note 23.
23 So far there have not been any reported cases involving prosecution of fraternization
as a violation of these regulations. In fact, an Air Force military judge expressly referred to
one of the regulations, AFR 30-1, as nonpunitive. United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM
23545, slip op. at 9 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 29, 1982)(Miller, J., concurring), modified on other
grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984).
"I E.g., United States v. Moorer, 15 M.J. 520 (A.C.M.R. 1983), petition granted, 16 M.J.
112 (C.M.A. 1983). The Fort Gordon policy letter provided in pertinent part:
1. Permanent party military personnel and civilian government employees of Fort
Gordon are prohibited from engaging in relationships or associations with soldiers
in a training status which are prejudicial to the order and discipline of the Armed
Forces. These associations and acts will include, .
a. Social fraternization . ...
5. This letter is directive in nature and violations of these policies will subject
offenders to punitive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or ad-
verse administrative action under appropriate regulations.
15 M.J. at 522-23. See also United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563, 568-69 (A.C.M.R.
1981)(quoting similar local policy), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
2 These directives by issuance from an officer having general court-martial jurisdiction
have the effect of regulations and can be enforced under Article 92. Nagle, supra note 119,
at 70-72.
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certain military employees "from engaging in relationships or associations
with soldiers in a training status."' 6 The letter also stated the "violation
of these policies will subject offenders to punitive action under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice.""' 7 Accordingly, Army courts have thus far
sustained these local regulations as the bases for an Article 92 violation.
128
b. Overbreadth
After meeting the punitiveness requirement, local fraternization regula-
tions must also comport with constitutional demands in order to serve as
the basis of a criminal conviction under Article 92. One of the constitu-
tional issues litigated in this context is whether local command directives
concerning fraternization are overbroad and thus facially invalid under
the first amendment.2 9 In view of the limitations of the overbreadth doc-
trine and Supreme Court decisions regarding its application in the mili-
tary arena, current local directives as applied are not impermissibly
overbroad.
A statute may be unconstitutionally overbroad if it potentially prohib-
its conduct protected by the first amendment. 130 The overbreadth doc-
trine provides that if a statute arguably affects first amendment rights, -a
litigant whose conduct is clearly prohibited can still challenge the consti-
tutionality of the statute under the amendment.' If the litigant shows
that the law substantially abridges the first amendment rights of third
parties not before the court, the court must find a constitutional viola-
tion.13' In this way, the accused may avoid conviction under the law. The
purpose of this doctrine is to facilitate voiding of the laws which by their
expansive prohibitions discourage the exercise of first amendment
rights. 3
3
In Parker v. Levy, 3 4 the Supreme Court limited the application of the
overbreadth doctrine under military law. The Levy case involved an
Army captain charged and convicted of violating Articles 133 and 134 af-
ter he made anti-war statements during the Vietnam war. 135 Captain
Levy ultimately appealed these convictions ultimately to the Supreme
" See supra note 124.
.. Id.
See Moorer, 15 M.J. at 522; Hoard, 12 M.J. at 568.
Hoard, 12 M.J. at 566-67. Other issues raised by the appellant were whether the regu-
lation infringed upon his right to marry and violated the equal protection guarantee. The
court resolved both issues against Sergeant Hoard. Id. at 567-68.
-s" See, e.g., Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
31 Id. For a more detailed analysis of the overbreadth doctrine, see Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
3 Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 634.
133 Id.
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
" Id. at 736-39.
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Court on several grounds, including overbreadth.'" Upon review, the
Court rejected the allegation that the articles were overbroad and violated
the first amendment. The Court held that the first amendment over-
breadth doctrine did not apply to the military in the same way that it
applies to civilian society.' 37 An individual in the military whose speech
was clearly prohibited by the articles could not assert the first amend-
ment rights of others. Since the Court found Captain Levy's speech to be
clearly prohibited by Articles 133 and 134, he lacked standing to claim
that they violated the free speech rights of other service members. "
The Army Court of Military Review considering a local fraternization
directive in United States v. Hoard,'3s discussed the application of the
overbreadth doctrine after Levy. Tackling a seminal question, the court
concluded that a fraternization policy prohibiting socializing and unoffi-
cial personal association did not affect traditional first amendment
rights. 40 It considered the prohibited activities as conduct rather than
speech or association of the type protected by the amendment.' 4' Despite
this holding, the court went on to engage in overkill by evaluating the
service member's first amendment overbreadth challenge. Although it
had already noted that the policy did not involve first amendment rights,
the court stated that, according to Parker v. Levy, Sergeant Hoard had
no standing in this Article 92 case to assert the abridgment of third par-
tiees' first amendment rights.'42 This decision, coupled with the Supreme
Court application of the overbreadth doctrine in court-martial cases,
strongly suggests local fraternization directives do not violate the first
amendment.
c. Vagueness
Whether local fraternization regulations fulfill the notice requirements
of procedural due process under the fifth amendment is more troubling.
While notice requirements are litigated more frequently than overbreadth
in fraternization cases, to date, military and civilian cojurts have found
"S' At that time Supreme Court review was not the next stage of appellate review after
the Court of Military Appeals. After disposition of a court-martial case by the Court of
Military Appeals, the service member desiring to appeal further, had to seek collateral re-
view by a federal district court. See D. SCHLUETER, supra note 6, § 8-19. Service members
can now obtain Supreme Court review by petitioning for certiorari after their case has been
decided by the Court of Military Appeals. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,
§ 10, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405-06.
117 Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
I d. at 760-61.
12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 566-67. The right of freedom of association becomes a first amendment right
only if some independent first amendment right is implicated. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 430 (1963).
"' Hoard, 12 M.J. at 566-67.
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adequate notice.'4 3 However, an analysis of these findings reveals an un-
warranted extension by the courts of the Supreme Court's decision in
Parker v. Levy1
4 4
An attack upon the notice provided by a federal criminal statute as-
sumes the form of an allegation that the law is void for vagueness and
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the due process clause requires that
criminal laws be drafted with sufficient precision so as to provide ade-
quate notice of the prohibited conduct.'4 ' The measure of sufficient no-
tice is common understanding and practice. 4"
The Supreme Court in Levy also considered a vagueness challenge to
Articles 133 and 134.'4 7 Again finding that the requirements and purposes
of the military warrant different application of a constitutional doctrine,
the Court held that the criminal statutes of the UCMJ do not have to be
drafted with the precision required of civilian criminal laws. 4 Even if
Articles 133 and 134 were worded broadly and seemed capable of reaching
constitutionally-protected conduct, the Court found sufficient notice
under the fifth amendment. A reasonable service member would, by read-
ing the Articles with awareness of their past judicial interpretation, un-
derstand the extent of the prohibited conduct. 9
The Army court in Hoard drew upon Levy in rejecting Sergeant
Hoard's other challenge to a local fraternization policy-that the policy
was void for vagueness.' 50 The local fraternization regulation in this case
prohibited socializing and unofficial personal association between military
personnel permanently assigned to Fort Dix and basic trainees."'1 A spe-
cial court-martial had convicted him under Article 92 after he, while per-
manently assigned to Fort Dix, entertained basic trainees in his
quarters."' Although indicating that it believed that the sergeant had ac-
tual notice that his conduct violated the directive, the court also stated
that the guidelines themselves provided sufficient notice that entertain-
"' E.g., Staton v. Froehlke, 390 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975)(former warrant officer at-
tacked prior fraternization conviction on vagueness grounds); United States v. Hoard, 12
M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(vagueness challenge to post regulation), appeal denied, 13 M.J.
31 (C.M.A. 1982).
144 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
,41 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). For a discussion of
the vagueness doctrine as it applies to Articles 133 and 134, see Note, Military Law-The
Standard of Constitutionality, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 325 (1975).
,4' Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162.
417 U.S. at 752-57.
I4' d. at 756.
Id. at 752-54, 757.
... 12 M.J. at 567.
'B' Id.
" Id. at 564-66.
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ing basic trainees constituted prohibited conduct.'
This holding probably exceeded the limits of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Levy that notice can be provided by the text of a statute and its
judicial interpretation. In Levy, the broadly worded prohibitions of Arti-
cles 133 and 134, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline
and conduct unbecoming an officer, had been interpreted by the courts.'
"4
The broadly-worded prohibition against socializing and unofficial per-
sonal association which Hoard was accused of violating had not been in-
terpreted by a court.55 It would have been a different matter if the regu-
lation had referred expressly to fraternization. As a federal district court
in Staton v. Froehlke'56 noted, fraternization prohibitions have been in-
terpreted by military courts. Without judicial definition, however, the
broad prohibitions against socializing and unofficial personal association
did not fulfill the requirements of sufficient notice of a military criminal
statute under Levy.
B. Article 133
The lack of guidelines indicating under which article fraternization
should be charged has permitted the recent conviction and attempts to
convict officers under Article 133.117 Considering the disciplinary basis of
the fraternization offense and the purpose of Article 133 to prohibit dis-
graceful or dishonorable activity by an officer, these charges were more
properly brought under Article 134, the general disciplinary article. 158
The early history of the fraternization offense and judicial interpreta-
tion of Article 133 account for continued, albeit diminished, prosecution
under Article 133. The history of the offense until the 1940's shows al-
.. Id. at 567.
417 U.S. at 752-54.
Assignment of Errors and Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 5, United States v. Hoard,
12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982). Although speaking
to overbreadth error, the service member's counsel stated: "Fort Dix Regulation 600-2 lacks
... extensive judicial interpretation." Id.
"1 390 F. Supp. 503, 506 (D.D.C. 1975).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983)(male officer who
had sexual relationships with three enlisted women outside of his chain of command had
not acted in a way that was unbecoming an officer in violation of Article 133); United States
v. Jefferson, 14 M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982)(male officer had sexual relations with enlisted
woman in his company thereby violating Article 133), petition granted, 15 M.J. 328 (C.M.A.
1983).
'8 The Manual for Courts-Martial defines conduct unbecoming an officer as:
Conduct violative of this article is action or behavior in an official capacity
which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as an officer, seriously compromises
the officer's character as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an unofficial or
private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the officer personally, seri-
ously compromises the person's standing as an officer.
MCM, supra note 27, at I 59c.
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most exclusive prosecution under the British and American antecedents
of Article 133.' 5 During that period, the military services and courts con-
sidered social association between officers and enlisted men demeaning to
the status of an officer in violation of these antecedent articles.' 0 Later,
in the 1940's the services and courts shifted their view of the effect of
fraternization from demeaning of an officer's status to prejudicial to unit
discipline.' 6' This shift should have mandated exclusive prosecution
under the general disciplinary article. However, military courts and com-
manders with little historical support interpreted Article 133 as having a
disciplinary component allowing continued prosecution under Article
133.6" Although a view that an officer's disgraceful or dishonorable activ-
ity prejudices discipline as well as demeans the status of an officer is
probably correct, continued prosecution of fraternization under Article
133 requires its characterization as disgraceful or dishonorable activity.
This characterization conflicts with the expressed basis of the military
fraternization policy which indicates that wrongful fraternization is not
dishonorable or disgraceful but injures discipline by its creation of the
potential for abuse of authority and unequal treatment of subordinates. 113
Despite the conflict, several military services continue to prosecute
fraternization as a violation of Article 133.16' The confusion generated by
this approach is illustrated by United States v. Jefferson.6 ' In Jefferson,
the Army Court of Military Review considered a case involving a married
male captain who had sex during duty hours with a married enlisted wo-
man assigned to his command.16 6 A general court-martial found him
guilty of fraternization and adultery in violation of Article 133 and sen-
tenced him to be dismissed from the Army. 16 7 Upon appeal, Captain Jef-
ferson alleged that the findings of guilt as to both adultery and fraterni-
zation were multiplicious. 6 s  Although the issue of whether his
", See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
*O Note, supra note 45, at 825-26.
'6' See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
162 E.g., United States v. Coronado, 11 M.J. 522 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981), appeal denied, 18
M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1984). Conduct within the scope of Article 133 is that "which undermines
[an officer's] integrity to the degree . . . [that it] destroys or seriously impugns respect for
the officer's standing as an individual, acceptance of his reliability, and obedience to his
orders." 11 M.J. at 528.
,e' See AR 600-20, supra note 23; 1971 AF Opinion, supra note 111.
' In addition to the authorities cited at note 517 supra, the Marine Corps in 1983
charged a lieutenant with fraternizing with an enlisted woman before their marriage under
Article 133. Navy Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1.
5 14 M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982), petition granted, 15 M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1983).
,6 Id. at 807-08.
,O Id. at 807.
,68 Id. The doctrine of multiplicity is the military equivalent of the merger of offenses
doctrine. For an analysis of the doctrine of multiplicity, see H. MowE1, supra note 6, § 2-
667. Military courts have held that under some circumstances the offense of fraternization is
multiplicious with other offenses. E.g., United States v. Lovejoy, 20 C.M.A. 18, 21, 42
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fraternizing conduct was properly charged under Article 133 was not
raised,"6 9 the court indirectly discussed the issue. Holding that adultery
and fraternization were both violations of Article 133, the court indicated
that fraternization was violative because it had a "demonstrable impact
on the discipline, authority, and morale of his unit."'0
The Army Court of Military Review ruling that fraternization violates
Article 133 by its adverse impact on discipline ignores a requirement of
all Article 133 offenses. Even if Article 133 is read to include some disci-
plinary offenses, these offenses must also be disgraceful or dishonorable
to be within the scope of the Article. 17 By merely equating acts which
prejudice discipline with disgraceful or dishonorable conduct, the court
implied that military commanders could apply Articles 133 and 134 inter-
changeably to a fraternizing officer.' 72 The wording of the Articles and
their interpretation by the Manual for Courts-Martial do not warrant
such a result. Since Article 134 punishes disciplinary offenses, unless frat-
ernization adversely affects discipline and disgraces or dishonors an of-
ficer, it, rather than Article 133, should apply.
C. Article 134
Association between officers or NCOs and lower ranking enlisted per-
sonnel violates Article 134 when it offends the military custom against
wrongful fraternization."' The current application, judicial definition,
and service interpretation of this custom have created ambiguity. In view
of this uncertainty, a preemptive regulatory definition becomes even more
necessary.
The general disciplinary article incorporates military customs including
C.M.R. 210, 213 (1970).
'69 Supplemented Petition for Grant of Review and Initial Brief, United States v. Jeffer-
son, 14 M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982), petition granted, 15 M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1983).
70 Jefferson, 14 M.J. at 810-11 (emphasis added).
17, See MCM, supra note 27, at 59c.
, , In its opinion, the court also referred with approval to a portion of the government's
reply brief stating that fraternization is behavior that is likely to dishonor and disgrace an
officer because it hampered existing rank structures. Jefferson, 14 M.J. at 810 n.3. This
again confuses dishonorable and disgraceful activity with conduct that is prejudicial to dis-
cipline. Rather than dishonoring a particular officer, behavior that hampers existing rank
structures affects military discipline.
"I' See Flatten, supra note 13, at 110-11. Such association may also violate Article 134,
even though it does not violate a custom against fraternization, when it otherwise consti-
tutes conduct which prejudices order and discipline. See United States v. Stocken, 17 M.J.
826, 828-30 (A.C.M.R. 1984)(although Army custom against fraternization did not extend to
NCOs, if an NCO's relationship with enlisted members was "easily recognizable as criminal
• . . [and had] a direct and immediate adverse impact on discipline," there was a violation
of Article 134); see also United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862, 868-69 (A.F.C.M.R.
1983)(even though a custom against fraternization could not serve as a basis for a violation
of Article 133 in the Air Force, sexual relationships between officers and enlisted personnel,
under certain circumstances, would still do so).
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the prohibition against fraternization.'74 The incorporation results from
an historical merger of military customs into the antecedents of the gen-
eral disciplinary article."" The present Manual for Courts-Martial, in its
guidelines for Article 134, recognizes the existence of this merger under
the UCMJ.'7 s However, the continuation of the merger requires that the
custom remain consistent with existing military statutes and regulations
and be currently observed."'
At the present time, numerous commentators and service members are
questioning the continued existence of a military custom against fraterni-
zation that is enforceable under Article 134.178 This questioning arises
from the conflicting characterization of the prohibition by military ser-
vices, courts, and individual commanders. For example, the services' frat-
ernization policies prohibit certain kinds of association between ranks.',
Yet, the same services condone and even encourage the same type of asso-
ciation between ranks through their housing, recreation, and marriage
policies. 8 0 Military courts add further to the confusion by defining
wrongful fraternization as abnormal social intercourse.' 8 ' Individual com-
manders, closest to the conduct, imply even a different definition of the
custom by applying judicial sanctions only when there is a command rela-
tionship between the fraternizing service members. 82 Some observers
"' W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 41-43.
" Id.
" MCM, supra note 27, at 60c(2)(b).
" The Manual states the requirements of a military custom under Article 134:
Custom arises out of long established practices which by common usage have at-
tained the force of law in the military or other community affected by them. No
custom may be contrary to existing law or regulation. A custom which has not
been adopted by existing statute or regulation ceases to exist when its observance
has been generally abandoned.
MCM, supra note 27, at I 60b(2)(b).
"' See United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545, slip op. at 4 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 29,
1982)(Miller, J., concurring)(custom no longer existed in Air Force); Flatten, supra note 13,
at 114-15 (Air Force attorney reached same conclusion).
In the past, at least one other military judge expressed a similiar view. In United States v.
Penick, 19 B.R. 257, 261-62 (A.B.R. 1945), a dissenting judge expressed his dissatisfaction
with the fraternization offense. He contended that officers socializing with subordinates did
not violate the disciplinary article because the Army encouraged officers to build close rela-
tionships with their men. The philosophy underlying the offense was inconsistent with a
democratic Army because it created a caste system, injured soldiers' self respect, and unduly
burdened an individual's freedom.
"' See AR 600-20, supra note 23; AFR 30-1, supra note 23.
so See Flatten, supra note 13, at 114. For example, Air Force regulations allow officers
and enlisted personnel to visit each other's clubs as guests, permit married officer-enlisted
couples to live in post housing, and provide for mixed participation in recreational and reli-
gious activities.
101 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
181 E.g., United States v. Horton, 14 M.J. 96 (C.M.A. 1982)(first sergeant accused of frat-
ernizing with female subordinates); United States v. Goodyear, 14 M.J. 567 (N.M.C.M.R.
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viewing the varying descriptions of fraternization which all depart sub-
stantially from its original definition, have concluded that there is no
longer a prosecutable custom."s3
Despite ambiguity as to the contours of the custom, the military ser-
vices charge fraternization most often as a violation of Article 134.184 This
occurs because so far only limited Army commands have punitive frater-
nization regulations that would sustain a conviction under Article 92.18
Article 133 is used less often because it requires disgraceful or dishonora-
ble acts by an officer. Rather than eroding the custom, the Marine Corps,
Army, and Navy have recently taken steps to preserve it, as evidenced by
numerous courts-martial and administrative proceedings.' This recent
tack has created additional confusion as to prohibited relationships under
the custom in the minds of both service members and military judges'. 18 7
In order to alleviate this confusion and the other problems associated
with the fraternization offense, the military services should issue punitive
regulatory standards to guide the participants in the military justice sys-
tem: the soldier, the commander, and the court. The next section of this
Note proposes those standards and other steps to clarify the fraterniza-
tion prohibition in the military.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As evidenced by the number of courts-martial, military personnel will
fraternize despite the prohibition."8 ' In view of the services' desire to en-
force the ban for disciplinary reasons, and military and civilian courts'
continued support, the rule will undoubtedly endure.188 However, the
1982)(training NCO accused of fraternizing with a recruit); United States v. Cooper, No.
CM438700 (A.C.M.R. Aug. 11, 1980)(fraternizing began when officer was enlisted woman's
company commander). But see United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545 (A.F.C.M.R.
Oct. 19, 1982)(no mention whether enlisted personnel were officer's subordinates), modified
on other grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984).
"3 See authorities cited supra note 178.
188 Flatten, supra note 13, at 110-11.
1 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. However, several commentators have
urged adoption of such service-wide standards. See Flatten, supra note 13, at 114; Navy
Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1.
's See authorities cited supra notes 31 & 182.
,s See, e.g., Rodriquez, No. ACM23545, slip op. at 4-14; Drogin, supra note 21, at 30-31.
One Army NCO, court-martialed for fraternizing with a basic trainee, expressed his confu-
sion: "I feel fraternization . . . conflicts with personal interests." Id. at 30.
188 From 1978 to 1983, there were at least eight reported and two unreported court-mar-
tial decisions involving a specification of fraternization. Other sources indicate additional
courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment. See Drogin, supra note 21, at 31; Navy Times,
Dec. 12, 1983, at 18, col. 1; id. Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1.
189 Civilian recognition of the basis for the prohibition, that intimate association between
superiors and subordinates interferes with working relationships, will probably encourage
this trend. See Jamison, supra note 14; Sexual Side of Enterprise, MGMT. REV., July 1980,
at 51; Unethical and Improper Behavior by Training Professionals, TRAINING & DEV. J.,
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fraternization offense as currently defined has great potential for arbi-
trary application.' 9 Although held to provide sufficient notice, the prohi-
bition provides little actual notice to a service member confronted by con-
flicting interpretations of the wrongful conduct. 19 The present lack of
guidelines, as to which article of the UCMJ is violated by fraternization,
permit its prosecution under Article 133, even though the requirements of
that Article may not be satisfied in fact.' 9' Thus, the military services
should take steps to avoid recurrences of the adverse consequences which
stem from enforcement of the prohibition.
The following steps are recommended. To minimize the possibility of
arbitrary application of the fraternization policy, the military services
should issue regulations setting forth the prohibited associational activi-
ties. The regulation should manifest its prohibitiveness and punitiveness
allowing prosecution under Article 92 of the UCMJ. 93 In indicating its
disciplinary purpose, the regulation should be gender neutral demonstrat-
ing its application to same and opposite sex fraternization.' Further-
more, the regulation should key its employment to immediate-command
relationships recognizing the services' self-imposed definition of wrongful
fraternization.' 9"
The regulation should encourage specific and timely reaction to its vio-
lation. By encouraging such response, commanders and supervisors may
be able to avoid commission of more serious offenses under the Code and
lessen sanctions applied to the service member. Unless the conduct has
proceeded to the point where it violates a substantive article of the
Dec. 1978, at 10. These writers indicate that sexual relationships between supervisors and
subordinates adversely affect the productivity and morale of nonparticipating employees.
,' Compare United States v. Newak, 15 M.J. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982)(female Air Force
lieutenant convicted of sodomy and drug offense involving enlisted personnel was not
charged with fraternization), petition granted, 18 M.J. 112 (C.M.A. 1984) with United
States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545 (A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 19, 1982)(fraternization conviction of
female Air Force lieutenant based upon sexual act and use of marijuana with enlisted per-
sonnel), modified on other grounds, 19 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984).
1"I E.g., United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31
(C.M.A. 1982). The argument that there is sufficient notice given by the fraternization pro-
hibition relies on evidence that the accused had actual notice or on past judicial interpreta-
tion. For example, the court in Staton v. Froehlke, 390 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975), indi-
cated that judicial decisions involving fraternization and homosexual conduct provided
sufficient notice as to prohibited fraternization between members of the opposite sex. Id. at
505-06.
192 E.g., United States v. Jefferson, 14 M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982), petition granted, 15
M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1983).
"' See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (explaining requirements of a punitive
regulation under Article 92).
"I Both types of fraternization have been held to prejudice order and discipline. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981)(prohibited fraternization included as-
sociation with male and female enlisted personnel), appeal denied, 13 M.J. 31 (C.M.A.
1982).
195 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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UCMJ (e.g., indecent assault, sodomy, etc.), violation of the regulation
should be met by counseling or nonjudicial punishment rather than by
court-martial. That treatment would standardize the method used by
most commanders when fraternization arises in a unit."'6 When a service
member's conduct violates the regulation and a substantive UCMJ arti-
cle, there should be prosecution of both offenses unless multiplicity inter-
venes. Such prosecution penalizes the conduct offending discipline and
warns of the services' continued desire to enforce the prohibition.
An additional aim ought to avoid the present discretionary enforcement
of the prohibition.197 The current discharge of military policy varies
widely among commands and raises charges of arbitrariness. It also cre-
ates a reasonable but erroneous perception among service members that
fraternization is permissible.' 98
The following regulation is suggested.
PROHIBITED RELATIONSHIPS
1. PURPOSE: This regulation prohibits higher ranking service
members from engaging in certain relationships with lower rank-
ing service members if:
(a) the service members are within the same chain of command;
or
(b) have a direct supervisory relationship; or
(c) are in the same battalion or lesser sized unit.
The relationships described in this regulation are likely to harm
discipline in military units. Military personnel cannot effectively
lead all their subordinates when they become intimately involved
with particular subordinates. Engaging in a prohibited relation-
ship under this regulation is a violation of Article 92 of the
UCMJ.
2. SCOPE: Compliance with this regulation is mandatory for all
service personnel. For UCMJ purposes, this regulation precludes
' See Flatten, supra note 13, at 114.
For examples of nonuniform application of the Army's fraternization policy, see
Drogin, supra note 21, at 30. One commentator indicates that the Air Force has the same
problem. Flatten, supra note 13, at 114. Nonuniformity is probably also present in the
Navy. See Navy Times, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18, col. 1. This Article, concerning a recent frater-
nization case in the Navy, states: "[The officer] continues to perform her duties in Norfolk
while the board recommendation [that she be discharged] is being reviewed. Recently an
ensign who recently [sic] arrived at her command married an enlisted man. [The officer]
said no action was taken against the other ensign." Id. at 20, col. 2.
A nondiscretionary approach has been studied and rejected by the Army and Navy. Both
services feared that detailed fraternization regulations would remove necessary com-
manders' discretion to apply the policy on a case by case basis. See Women in the Military
Hearings, supra note 23, at 118; Navy Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1.
I"' See Drogin, supra note 21, at 30.
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further fraternization specifications under Articles 133 and 134.
Nothing in this regulation shall be construed to apply to marital
relationships between service members.
3. PROHIBITED RELATIONSHIPS:
(a) dating or sexual activity; or
(b) frequent socializing where rank is ignored.
4. COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES:
(a) Commanders should not ignore the beginning signs of a pro-
hibited relationship between unit members. By counseling the
members involved, the commander may avoid the necessity of
nonjudicial punishment or more serious action.
(b) If there has been a violation of this regulation, the com-
mander should use nonjudicial punishment or counseling unless
the service member's conduct also violates other Articles of the
UCMJ (with the exception of Article 133 or the prejudice or dis-
credit clauses of Article 134).
(c) If the service member's conduct violates this regulation and
other Articles of the UCMJ (with the exception of Article 133 or
the prejudice and discredit clauses of Article 134) the commander
can take action as appropriate. If permissible under military law,
violation of the regulation should be sanctioned.
(d) Commanders should ensure that all personnel become fa-
miliar with the purpose and requirements of this regulation.
As a final matter, implementation of the issued punitive fraternization
regulation should include measures tending to ensure that service mem-
bers will become aware of its standards.199 Basic and officers' training
must instruct enlisted and officer trainees about the existence and neces-
sity of the military prohibition. The teaching should go beyond mere ref-
erence to the policy. It should emphasize: the rationale underlying the
policy; the kinds of forbidden association; adverse consequences of viola-
tion; and courses of action when the rule and reality meet."'0
' The UCMJ itself, at least in the case of enlisted personnel, provides one measure.
Article 137, 10 U.S.C. § 937 (1982), requires that the punitive Articles of the Code be "ex-
plained to each enlisted member at the time of his entrance on active duty, or within six
days thereafter." When commands fulfill this requirement, explanation of the fraternization
policy could also occur.
In the case of officers, this instruction is also needed. In the past, officer training courses
only briefly mentioned the prohibition. See Flatten, supra note 13, at 109 (providing exam-
ple of the discussion). During the active duty service of the author of this Note, in the Army
from 1978 to 1982, the existence of the prohibition was alluded to briefly in an officer's
basic course. In this author's experience, even after issuance of the Army regulation pro-
scribing certain types of fraternization, the limits of superior and subordinate relationships
were rarely discussed or disseminated among officers and NCOs.
200 A Department of Defense official suggested one course of action. "[If [superiors and
subordinates] want to marry, they would have to work toward getting one of them a transfer
to another department." Navy Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 26, col. 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recognized in Parker v. Levy2"' that the military
has an exceptionally strong interest in order and discipline. One of the
methods of effectuating this interest is prosecution of disciplinary of-
fenses such as wrongful fraternization. By judicial interpretation and ser-
vice application, this offense has incorporated numerous conflicting
meanings.2 0 2 The failure to preempt these varying definitions by service
wide regulatory standards creates unnecessary confusion in both service
members' and military courts' understanding of the prohibition.2 0 3 With
renewed emphasis on the prohibition, further confusion seems likely.
Prosecution of associational-type conduct under Articles 133 and 134
without charging fraternization helps to blur definitions. 0
There is a great need to provide detailed standards to service members,
commanders, and other participants in the military justice system as to
what relationships between service members of different rank are permis-
sible. The services can accomplish this objective by issuing detailed and
punitive fraternization regulations. By, doing so, they should eliminate
prosecution under the essentially standardless Articles 133 and 134. Be-
sides providing necessary clarification, the services might avoid congres-
sional intervention fueled by public dissatisfaction.
2
0
5
MARGARET A. McDEvITT
201 417 U.S. 733, 743-45 (1974).
22 See supra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
203 An example of the confusion is United States v. Rodriquez, No. ACM23545
(A.F.C.M.R. Oct. 19, 1982), modified on other grounds, 18 M.J. 363 (C.M.A. 1984). The
service member contended that fraternization was not an offense under the UCMJ. Id. at 1.
The majority held that it was an offense, but that the military judge erred in instructing the
members of the court on the elements of the offense. Id. at 3. A concurring judge decided
that fraternization was no longer an offense. Id. at 11-12.
"I E.g., United States v. Newak, 15 M.J. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982)(officer convicted of drug
and sex offenses with enlisted personnel), petition granted, 18 M.J. 112 (C.M.A. 1984);
United States v. Coronado, 11 M.J. 522 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981)(officer court-martialed for sexual
acts with enlisted man), appeal denied, 18 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1984).
205 In 1980, the following exchange took place between an Army spokesman and a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives:
[Congressman] WHITE. I really think the DOD ought to present to Congress
some kind of [specific and uniform fraternization policy]. Every day - not every
day, frequently, I have some member contact me because someone is wrestling
with two officers or officer and enlisted man problem as to fraternization. There
are as many results or policies as there are incidents. I feel this is very destructive
to morale. You are losing good officers and men and enlisted women and women
officers, I am sure, as a result of not having a clear position.
When I say you, I am talking about the Department of Defense.
MR. CLARK [Army spokesman]. I am not aware, frankly, that we have any de-
gree of dissatisfaction about that policy. I am fully aware of the one incident, of
course. We simply should not judge a policy by one incident.
[Congressman] WHITE. I suggest a lot of people are winging at the problem right
now, not addressing it, hoping it might go away, but it is not going to.
Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 23, at 130.
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